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BOOK REVIEW
THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN. By EARL WARREN.
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1977. Pp. xii, 394. $12.95.
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER *
It is unique in the literature of the Supreme Court when one of
its members - indeed, a leading figure in its history - breaks the
tradition of judicial silence and publishes an autobiographical com-
mentary on his career that discusses the work of the Court during his
tenure. Almost nothing is comparable, and very little is even analogous
in the writings of other Justices. Assiduous editors coaxed Oliver
Wendell Holmes I and Felix Frankfurter 2 into expressing their views
and revealing some of their personal histories. During the period be-
tween his services as Associate and Chief Justice, Charles Evans
Hughes published a series of lectures on the workings of the Court,3
and his "autobiographical notes" also have been published. 4 Students
of such luminaries as Louis D. Brandeis, 5 Hugo L. Black,6 and William
0. Douglas 7 have published collections and interpretations of their
judicial writings. There also are a fair number of biographies of
* A.B., B.S., Washington University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Missouri;
LL.B., University of Nebraska. John Marshall Professor of Law, College of
William and Mary.
1. HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS (abr. ed. M. Howe ed. 1963); HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS (2d ed. M. Howe ed. 1961).
2. FELIx FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (H. Phillips ed. 1960); FROM THE DIARIES
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (J. Lash ed. 1975); ROOSEVELT & FRANKFURTER: THEIR
CORRESPONDENCE (M. Freedman ed. 1967).
3. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928). See also
Chief Justice Taft's articles on the need for reform in the organization of the
judiciary. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A.J. 601 (1922); Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress,
8 A.B.A.J. 34 (1922).
4. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (D. Danelski &
J. Tulchin eds. 1973).
5. A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957);
THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS (S. Goldman ed. 1953). See also LETTERS OF
LOUIs D. BRANDEIS (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 4 vols. 1971-75).
6. ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM (I. Dilliard ed. 1963).
7. V. COUNTRYMAN, THE DOUGLAS OPINIONS (1977).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
individual Justices, including two on Chief Justice Earl Warren. s In
Warren's case another unique resource for the study of the man and
his career exists in the substantial collection of transcripts assembled
by the Earl Warren Oral History Project at the University of Cali-
fornia at BerkeleyY The controversial and cataclysmic era of the War-
ren Court also has produced a steady flow of books and periodical
literature.10 Accordingly, the Memoirs may be placed in perspective
from the outset, and a comparison of Warren's viewpoints with those
of others on the same subjects is possible. This is fortuitous particu-
larly in the case of an autobiography; by its very nature such a
volume, however frank and intellectually honest it attempts to be, is
essentially an apologia pro sua vita.
Frequently an autobiography may be the only source for certain
fundamental insights into the thoughts and convictions of a man like
Warren." All too often, the papers that a jurist or political leader
leaves for public study prove to be innocuous and insubstantial, 2 and
on the rare occasion when a biographer discovers and exposes some
truly revealing material from such papers, the revelation tends to
make others more secretive than before." How much can be learned
8. L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1967); J. WEAvER,
WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1968).
9. Under the direction of the Regional Oral History Office of the Bancroft
Library of the University of California, the Warren Project has tape recorded
interviews with a large number of individuals associated with Warren's Cali-
fornia career. Transcripts of interviews are available from the Bancroft Library.
Some also are available for study in the Library of the College of William and
Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law, where an east coast collection of the
transcripts is being assembled. Hereinafter, references to the transcripts are to
the collection at the University of California. An additional resource for the
study of Warren may be found in the five volume collection of the Chief Justice's
speeches that is located in the law library of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
10. Among the more informative studies are A. BICKEL, POLITICS & THE
WARREN COURT (1965); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968); J. FRANK, THE
WARREN COURT (1964). See Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a Con-
stitutional Revolution, 23 VAND. L. REv. 205 (1970) ; books cited at note 15 infra.
11. For example, Warren noted of one California governor, William Stevens:
"He was a wholesome man, but not an activist . . . ." E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS
OF EARL WARREN 56 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MEMOIRS].
12. This reviewer constantly has been disappointed when searching for Execu-
tive Department and Supreme Court documents that must have existed at some-
time, somewhere. Presidential libraries characteristically offer bulging file folders
containing the most routine records and correspondence, with only microscopic
traces of substantive documents. See W. SWINDLER, COURT & CONSTITUTION IN
THE 20TH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968, at 500 (1970).
13. At least one reviewer criticized the publication of Chief Justice Stone's
more controversial comments in A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
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about the Chief Justice from the Memoirs largely depends upon how
the original manuscript was edited. The editors are not identified, but
response to an inquiry indicates' that they are members of the pub-
lisher's staff who worked closely with Warren after he had prepared
the original draft. Apparently, their principal concern was to help the
Chief Justice enliven the text, which still retains a certain prosaism.
Warren obviously saved his eloquence for opinions and face-to-face
dialogues.j 4
The passions generated during Warren's tenure on the Supreme
Court are still strong. The books published since his death have con-
tinued to debate the issues in the famous decisions and have kept the
controversies of his Chief Justiceship in the forefront of awareness
of new generations of students. 15 Only four members of the Warren
Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White, remain on
the bench; this prompts recurrent pronouncements by journalistic
savants that the Warren constitutional doctrines have become a
minority view."-
Warren's contemporary critics frequently complained that his prac-
tical professional experience was limited, but the record demonstrates
that, before he was elected governor of California, he served for
twenty years as district attorney of Alameda County and as the state
attorney general. His two principal biographers devoted substantial
portions of their books to this period, 7 and the impressive anti-crime
record he compiled in those positions contrasts with the criticism that
the Court became "soft" on criminals under Warren. The Chief Justice
himself viewed both the evolution of the law and his resulting con-
LAW (1956). Westin, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 462, 468-69 (1957). See also
Kurland, Book Review, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1323 (1957).
14. Warren's only other writings appear in a collection, THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN (H. Christman ed. 1959), and in a succinct com-
mentary on the modern Constitution. E. WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP
IT (1972).
15. See, e.g., G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977);
R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION (1977); C. KILGORE, JUDICIAL
TYRANNY (1977); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? (1975).
16. See, e.g., Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger
Court, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 265; Swindler, The Court, the Constitution, and Chief
Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L. REV. 443, 445, 449-50 (1974); Cf. R. HARRIS, JUSTICE
237-38 (1970). As to Warren's observations on the media's coverage of the Court,
see text accompanying note 58 infra.
17. L. KATCHER, supra note 8, at 29-78; J. WEAVER, supra note 8, at 34-50. See
generally PERSPECTIVES ON THE ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
(U. Cal. 3 vols. 1972-74).
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ceptions of it as the logical consequences of the changing constitutional
frames of reference from the twenties to the fifties.1 8
As district attorney, Warren led movements to develop a school for
the better education and training of police - the first of its kind in
the United States 19 - to establish family courts and remove domestic
cases from the criminal process, 20 and to provide a public defender's
office for indigents. 21 As attorney general, he found immediate op-
portunity for crime fighting; on his first day in office, after receiving
evidence of a busy traffic in the sales of pardons for convicts with
influential outside connections, Warren arranged for the indictment,
prosecution, and conviction of the leader of the activity, a newly ap-
pointed state judge.22 One of Warren's major criminal prosecutions
as district attorney involved violent radicalism in the waterfront labor
movement. The man who later, as Chief Justice, would be accused of
being "soft" on Communism, secured convictions of several radical
union participants who had been connected with a "goon squad"
murder of an unsympathetic supervisor. 23
Before his service on the Court converted him into a liberal hero,
one of the persistent criticisms of Warren concerned his role in the
Japanese-American relocation during World War 11.24 The pre-
Warren Court reluctantly extended the relocation a constitutional
vindication, 25 but Warren himself wrote: "I have since deeply re-
gretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it .... 26
The sincerity of this statement and the convictions of the Chief
Justice were attested by his efforts supporting legislation to withdraw
18. See MEMOIRS, at 117, 316-17.
19. Id. at 106-08.
20. Id. at 121.
21. Id. See generally Interview with Willard W. Shea, Recollections of Alameda
County's First Public Defender, in Oakland (Jan. 26, Feb. 9, 18, & March 18,
1970), reprinted in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY'S OFFICE 4-18 (U. Cal. 1972).
22. MEMOIRS, at 127-29.
23. Id. at 113-16. See generally LABOR LEADERS VIEW THE WARREN ERA (U. Cal.
1976); LABOR LOOKS AT EARL WARREN (U. Cal. 1970); THE SHIPBOARD MURDER
CASE: LABoR, RADICALISM & EARL WARREN, 1936-1941 (U. Cal. 1976). At the
conclusion of a chapter on "Crime, Violence & Dissent," Warren notes the relative
peace that since has come to industrial labor relations. E. WARREN, supra note 14,
at 97-108.
24. See generally JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELOCATION REVIEWED (U. Cal. vol. 1
1976, vol. 2 1974).
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. MEMOIRS, at 149.
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from the Attorney General the power to impound suspected sub-
versives in peacetime.2 7 Nevertheless, Warren's wartime actions
placed him in a position that contributed to distinct ambivalences at
the time of his confirmation in 1953.28
The Memoirs only briefly acknowledge this contradiction in public
images. With respect to the claim that "there was nothing in my back-
ground to presage my so-called 'liberal' decisions on the Supreme
Court," Warren states that it was always "something of a mystery
to me." 29 He describes a rather awkward moment in a conversation
with former President Eisenhower who, while accompanying the
Chief Justice to Winston Churchill's funeral, complained about all
"those Communist cases" (which Eisenhower admitted that he had
not read) :
I tried to explain that in the judging process we were obliged
to judge Communists by the same rules that we applied to all
others. He refused to accept this statement, and I asked him:
"What would you do with Communists in America?"
"I would kill the S.O.B.s," he said.3 0
Despite the unpleasantness of this exchange, Warren indicates that it
was valuable because it had provided him with his first opportunity
to explain to Eisenhower his concept of the distinction between
judicial and political moderation:
Through politics, which has been defined as the art of the
possible, progress could be made and most often was made by
compromising and taking half a loaf where a whole loaf
could not be obtained. The opposite is true so far as the judi-
cial process was concerned. Through it, and particularly in
the Supreme Court, the basic ingredient of decision is prin-
ciple, and it should not be compromised and parceled out a
little in one case, a little more in another, until eventually
someone receives the full benefit. If the principle is sound
and constitutional, it is the birthright of every American,
not to be accorded begrudgingly or piecemeal or to special
groups only, but to everyone in its entirety whenever it is
brought into play.3
1
If the foregoing quotation may be taken as a summation of War-
ren's philosophy, it provides some support for the observation that
27. Id. at 149-50.
28. See SWINDLER, supra note 12, at 222; 5 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARINGS & REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL & UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972 (R.
Mersky & J. Jacobstein comps. 1975) (Nomination of Earl Warren).
29. MEMOIRS, at 4-5.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
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the later Warren Court made broad judicial pronouncements but
failed to consider adequately the precise contours and applications of
its decisions.32 The filling-in of details, however, is inherently a
piecemeal process that is accomplished through the sound practice of
judicial restraint, permitting a logical development of the law through
a case-by-case approach.
In the Eisenhower context, however, the predisposition of the Presi-
dent to "parcel out" constitutional guarantees was strikingly evident
before Brown v. Board of Education3 was decided:
I have always believed that President Eisenhower resented
our decision in Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny.
Influencing this belief, among other things, is an incident
that occurred shortly before the opinion was announced. The
President had a program for discussing problems with
groups of people at occasional White House dinners. When
the Brown case was under submission, he invited me to one
of them. I wondered why I should be invited because the
dinners were political in nature, and there was no place for
me in such discussions. But one does not often decline an in-
vitation from the President to the White House, and I ac-
cepted .... I was'. . . within speaking distance of John W.
Davis, the counsel for the segregation states. During the din-
ner, the President went to considerable lengths to tell me
what a great man Mr. Davis was. [After dinner, Eisen-
hower] took me by the arm, and, as we walked along, speak-
ing of the Southern states in the segregation cases, he said,
"These are not bad people. All they are concerned about is to
see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school
alongside some big overgrown Negroes." 34
Warren unequivocally believed that the President's reluctance to
offer any executive support for the Court's holding in Brown merely
contributed to the aggravated racial tensions existing after that
decision. 35 When the administration finally was forced to invoke its
authority in the Little Rock school case, Warren was disappointed
with Eisenhower's failure to make a direct public statement that the
law as pronounced by the Supreme Court was to be upheld.36
32. See, e.g., Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3 (1969);
Swindler, supra note 16, at 449. Fred Graham discusses the sweeping declarations
of the Warren Court's major criminal procedure decisions in F. GRAHAM, THE
DuE PROCESS REVOLUTION (1970).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. MEMOIRS, at 291.
35. Id. at 289-91.
36. Id. at 289-90 n. t. For Warren's view on the problem of racial relations gen-
erally see E. WARREN, supra note 14, at 49-57.
164 [Vol. 19:159
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Warren comments frankly on the controversies of his Chief Justice-
ship, most of which are discussed in a remarkable penultimate chapter
subtitled "The Court and its Castigators." 37 He does not settle
definitively the question of how the office was offered to him in
September, 1953, but speculation on this issue probably has exag-
gerated its importance. 38 The Chief Justice discusses in greater detail,
however, the sequence of events that led him to resign from the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) .A9 The difficulties began in 1957 when the
ABA arranged a pilgrimage to London to engage in joint meetings
with the British bar. The Chief Justice -was invited by the national
organization to lead the delegation, but during the convention's first
morning in London, the ABA released a committee report to the press
on "Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives":
It told little about those matters; rather, it was a diatribe
against the Supreme Court of the United States, charging it
with aiding the Communist cause in fifteen recent cases. It
listed the allegedly pro-Red cases, giving biased outlines of
their facts and the Court's holdings, then arguing that they
gave great joy and comfort to the Communists. Finally, it
recommended that Congress enact legislation to protect the
nation from the effect of these sinister Supreme Court
decisions.40
The report was prepared before the trip, and Warren concluded that
its release had been postponed to stimulate attention for an otherwise
uneventful junket.41 Although there was no debate on the report
and despite the subsequent deletion of its more virulent parts from the
ABA's permanent record, the Association took no action to correct mis-
leading assertions by the press that the report represented the view of
the organization.42 During the convention the ABA rejected another
Supreme Court doctrine in recommending that the district courts be
permitted to imprison summarily for contempt those persons who
refused to respond to inquiries of the House Un-American Activities
Committee; together, these two actions by the Association provided
the grounds for Warren's resignation.
43
37. Id. at 321-49.
38. Id. at 270-71. See EARL WARREN: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP (U. Cal. 1977).
39. MEMOIRS, at 321-31.
40. Id. at 322.
41. Id. at 323-24.
42. Id. at 324.
43. Id. at 324-25. "The combination of these reports did much disservice to the
Supreme Court .... [I] ... concluded that I could no longer be a member of an
organization of the legal profession which would . . . deliberately and trickily
contrive to discredit the Supreme Court which I headed." Id. at 325.
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Unfortunately, the Association was unrepentant, and the Court
again was chastised during the ABA's 1958 national convention, which
Warren had agreed to attend to demonstrate that his resignation was
not tendered because of personal pique:
It was a great mistake. While there with four other Justices
of the Supreme Court, I attended a dinner given by one of the
committees, and without warning Chief Justice John R.
Dethmers of the state of Michigan, a vitriolic fellow, gave the
U.S. Supreme Court a lambasting the like of which I had
never heard. That, of course, attracted the news media and
produced reportage highly derogatory to the Court.44
Although later ABA presidents sought to atone for the Association's
behavior during these years, 45 Warren, on behalf of the Supreme
Court, never accepted the excuses:
If the Court cannot rely upon the main national body of the
legal profession to treat it fairly in times of stress, whether
it be the Communist scare, the racial question, the "law and
order" crisis, or the so-called "strict constructionist" theory
of the Constitution, it is, indeed, defenseless against the most
powerful and reactionary interests in the nation.
46
During this period, anticommunist hysteria obviously had in-
fluenced legal conservatives. This was not the first instance, however,
in which the ABA failed to recognize and respond to the country's
changing societal needs because of its close ties with the corporate
establishment. Indeed, nearly twenty years earlier, the ABA had
reached the verge of barratry in offering its services to defend
private enterprise from New Deal legislation. Warren accounted for
this failure of leadership by explaining that the Association's long-
standing commercial and geographical interests were too influential
and entrenched to be disturbed.47 These strong interests have forced
the ABA to give inadequate consideration to fundamental principles
in competing areas of the law, especially with respect to individual
rights.48 As a result, Warren suggested that two broadly based legal
organizations be created: one oriented toward the traditional com-
mercial and industrial interests and the other committed to the pro-
tection of human rights.49
44. Id. at 328.
45. Id. at 329-30.
46. Id. at 330.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 331.
49. Id. at 330-31.
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Warren's last major disclosure, second in significance only to the
Eisenhower commentary on segregation, reveals an attempt by the
early Nixon administration to influence the outcome of certain wire-
tapping cases.5 0 An emissary of the Justice Department gave Warren
and Justice Brennan the gratuitous assurance that, despite the Court's
recent decision against the Government in Alderman v. United
States,51 the Attorney General, John Mitchell, "would do anything at
all that would help the Court avoid a congressional reaction which
might either lead to a Constitutional Amendment or some legislation to
curtail the Court's jurisdiction." 52 Because neither possibility had
been proposed in Congress, the Chief Justice concluded that the mes-
sage's purpose was to reveal "an undisclosed objective of the new
Administration." 53 Warren decided against exposing the clumsy
threat because he believed no purpose would be served through a
confrontation with the administration; he also reasoned that, be-
cause of Nixon's previous anti-Court animus, a revelation could be
criticized as more vindictive than meritorious. 54
In contrast to his silence in the wiretapping intrigue, Warren did
publicize a different machination that was intended to undermine the
early reapportionment decisions. 55 Speaking at the dedication of the
new Duke Law School building in 1963, he criticized the legal profes-
sion's failure to examine and debate the recently proposed "con-
federating" amendments to the Constitution. 6
Actually, Warren initiated a leadership role for the Chief Justice-
ship, since expanded by his successor, in the modernization of the
judicial process. 57 Unfortunately, the substantial extra-judicial accom-
plishments of both Warren and Chief Justice Burger have drawn little
50. Id. at 337-42. Attorney General John Mitchell wanted to limit the reach of
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), so that the Government would
be successful in a group of subsequent wiretapping cases. The Court nevertheless
rejected the Attorney General's argument in Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S.
310 (1969).
51. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
52. MEMOIRS, at 339.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 341. Subsequent evidence of government misconduct caused Warren
to question the wisdom of his decision to not expose the threat by the Depart-
ment of Justice. Id. at 342.
55. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56. Warren, Dedication of the New Duke Law School Building, 1963 DUKE L.J.
387, 393-94. Warren discusses the proposed amendments in MEMOIRS, at 309-12.
For an analysis of the proposals see Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federal-
ism: The Confederating Proposals, 52 GEO. L.J. 1 (1963).
57. See Swindler, The Chief Justice & Law Reform, 1921-1971, 1971 SUP. CT.
REV. 241.
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notice outside the profession; reporters, instead, have preferred to
comment on items such as the type of transportation utilized by the
Justices.5 8
The Court, of course, is not the only institution that suffers from
superficial journalistic treatment, but given the fundamental im-
portance of this least understood branch of government, the failure
of the media to interpret its function and decisions consistently and
intelligibly disturbs many members of the bench and bar. For ex-
ample, Warren has stated:
The reason [the Court's] activities are not better known
is because the media does not consider the Court's work
newsworthy until it makes a decision which stirs emotion on
the part of great numbers of people on the losing side. Then
the media gives a superficial judgment which is often wide
of the mark, and leaves the matter to the public in that un-
satisfactory condition. This is largely because news gatherers
are not deeply concerned with the proceedings before the
Court until decision day; their homework is thus generally
inadequate.5 9
Although a few reporters are highly informed and very competent in
their interpretations of judicial doctrine, 60 generally, the sporadic and
often garbled reporting of Court actions over many years has offset
the accomplishments of these individuals.
The final chapter in the Memoirs discusses, somewhat defensively,
Warren's controversial chairmanship of the commission selected to in-
vestigate the assassination of President Kennedy.61 The Chief Justice
was aware that the inadvisability of jurists serving in non-judicial
capacities potentially conflicting with their primary duties had been
demonstrated convincingly. 2 Justice Jackson's role as American
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, for instance, evoked
internal dissension among the members of the Court.6 3 These tradi-
tionally reasonable objections to Warren's service on the assassina-
tion commission were amplified by the activities of those persons who
58. Warren discusses the Court's automobile problem in MEMOIRS, at 347-48. As
to the Chief Justice's dealings with the press, see id. at 343-44.
59. Id. at 335.
60. One of the more astute court reporters is Fred Graham, who is also an
attorney. He has written a book analyzing the Warren Court's impact on criminal
procedure. F. GRAHAM, supra note 32.
For a discussion of the tension between the government and the fourth estate
see PRESS FREEDOMS UNDER PRESSURE (20th Century Fund 1972).
61. MEMOIRS, at 351-72.
62. Id. at 356.
63. Warren notes the difficulty created by Jackson's absence. Id. See generally
W. SWINDLER, supra note 12, at 157-62.
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later claimed to possess proof of suppressed or newly discovered evi-
dence. Nevertheless, President Johnson overcame Warren's reluctance
to participate in the investigation and drafted the Chief Justice into
service as the chairman of the commisson.64
Warren's participation in the Kennedy investigation is a cloud over
the record of the Warren Court itself, and some of the public still
regards his actions with the same enmity that they hold for the
Court's constitutional doctrines. The Chief Justice, however, did not
absorb all the animosity: some was directed at the commission as a
whole, primarily by those who could not bring themselves to abandon
a conspiracy theory when the final report found Oswald solely re-
sponsible for the murder.6 5 Reaffirming the commission's findings in
the Memoirs, Warren drew upon his long experience as a prosecutor
and declared that "had it not been for the prominence of the victim,
the case against Oswald could have been tried in two or three days,
with little likelihod of any but one result." 66
According to the editors' epilogue, the manuscript was incomplete
at the time of Warren's death, and a number of additional comments
were left unwritten. 7 Nevertheless, the Memoirs give a far more de-
tailed view behind the judicial curtain, and a more significant revela-
tion of Warren himself, than heretofore has been available to students
of the Court and this Chief Justice. His discussion of Brown and its
arguments both before the bench and in judicial conference carries an
authoritativeness that could be given only by one in his position.68 He
regarded the busing problem as a false issue and believed that busing
is a useful tool of the judiciary that ultimately, should stimulate ef-
forts to make all schools equal. 69 Finally, the Chief Justice provided
an insightful discussion of the circumstances surrounding the develop-
ment of the reapportionment doctrine.70
64. Id. at 357-58.
65. Id. at 362-63, 366-67, 370-71. In describing the work of the Commission,
Warren stated:
The facts of the assassination itself are simple, so simple that many
people believe it must be more complicated and conspiratorial to be
true. If the sole responsibility of the Commission had been to deter-
mine who shot and killed President Kennedy, it would have taken
very little work; the time-consuming and painstaking job was run-
ning down the wild rumors.
Id. at 362.
66. Id. at 367.
67. Id. at 373-74.
68. Id. at 281-302.
69. Id. at 301-02.
70. Id. at 307-12.
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CONCLUSION
Commenting on his Court, Warren wrote in summation:
The Supreme Court is particularly subject to criticism be-
cause most of its decisions are, as they say in athletic events,
"close calls" and "judgment calls." Also, as a case wends its
way to the Supreme Court, it becomes charged with emotion
from the publicity given it and the discussion that follows. In
addition, the questions presented to the Court are public
questions which normally affect large groups of people. Add
to these things the fact that its decisions are final, and one
can easily see why the Supreme Court would attract more
criticism than other courts. Also, the criticism becomes effec-
tive because it is a one-sided affair. Justices must take it in
silence, leaving it to the people to form their own opinions
concerning the Court's actions."'
In his Memoirs, Warren felt sufficiently freed from the restraints
normally incumbent upon sitting Justices to attempt, some years
after the fact, to rebut some of the more flagrant attacks on his
previous administration. The editors' conclusion that Warren "was
an anomaly in the American governmental system" 72 is indisputable.
"He stood for all the storied nineteenth-century virtues," 73 and there-
fore may not have been entirely in tune with changing twentieth-
century societal attitudes. This was probably the Chief Justice's
greatest attribute. His career on the Supreme Court represented an
attempt to identify the basic human values inherent in the American
system and applicable in any century.
71. Id. at 319.
72. Id. at 375.
73. Id.
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